top of page

The quest for the (not yet truly found) European ecosocial contract

Nov 3
5 min read

Written by Gustavo García-López and Rui F. Carvalho at the Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra.


Europe is facing a polycrisis, with interconnected and mutually reinforcing crises. This has led the European Union to embark on a quest for solutions towards a resilient future. A significant part of this discourse has been framed around the European Green Deal, a transformative vision for a new European ecosocial contract. What does this vision, if there is in fact a single vision, of an ecosocial contract look like when translated into policy? More specifically, does the European Green Deal enact a vision of an ecosocial contract?


We explored these questions through a literature and policy review, alongside case analyses from four European countries: Bulgaria, Finland, Germany and Portugal. In short, there is no single vision of an ecosocial contract. And, while the European Green Deal seeks to translate (some of) these principles into policy, its practical application has yet to live up to its promises.


The idea of ecosocial contract has various roots, merging more eco-centric principles on the inherent value of nature (e.g. the natural contract promoted by Michel Serres in the 1990s, or the rights of nature proposals today)  with principles of environmental justice, climate justice, and just transitions, focused on equity, participatory democracy, and the value of local communities’ knowledge and cultures. Some analysts, mostly from Latin America, have referred to an ecosocial pact rather than an ecosocial contract. This vision attends to global inequalities and criticizes the predominantly capitalist, legalistic, Western-dominated scope of previous visions. In Europe, discussions have mostly centred on the concept of the “Green Deal” and “just transitions”.


The European Green Deal (EGD) proposes addressing climate change and social inequalities, mostly by focusing on coupling decarbonization efforts with green economic growth and the creation of green jobs. But is this enough for a genuine (resilient) ecosocial contract prepared to face the polycrisis?


On paper, it appears so. The EGD statedly cares for democracy and democratic resilience, with concerns for participation, deliberation, and redistribution expressed throughout, as ends in themselves and as means to the desired ecological and social transformation. These are coupled with a focus on inclusion: expanding the participation, redistribution, and recognition of often marginalized social groups, communities and territories vulnerable to economic, social, and ecological harms.


Finally, the EGD is grounded on the continuous dimension of resilience, i.e. the systemic capacity for constant reform and adaptation, even amid crisis, conflict, and contestation. Only an EGD and (eco)social contract that remain open and committed to democratic ideals can be truly inclusive, sustainable, and foster enduring citizen support.


However, drawing on existing literature and four empirical country case studies, we found that the EGD’s promises on paper may be falling short of their intended goals. First, critical research shows how the EGD “in praxis” has fallen prey to three main myths: the coupling of progress and development with the need for endless economic growth; and the two related myths of the white saviour and of the empty resource frontier, both argued to configure the EGD as a strategy geared towards “green colonialism” (Almeida et al. 2023). Beyond these myths, the EGD has also been characterized as sociologically thin and, especially, insensitive to the needs and voices of marginalized groups and territories.


Our case studies from Bulgaria, Finland, Germany and Portugal, show further contradictions in the implementation of the EGD, concluding that in some ways, it has not lived up to its normative promises in Europe. Importantly, although the cases were written independently and in response to a fairly general and flexible prompt, they delivered common conflicts, both in the most crucial sectors and topics of contention and in the core political and social actors involved.


In Bulgaria, ecological struggles have “revitalized its latent historical legacy of environmental causes working as catalysts for democratic agency” – a resilience rooted in society, not institutions, as citizens mobilize despite distrusting the state. Yet environmental issues are easily politicized, and disinformation frames the EGD as an external imposition. Lacking institutional traction, local alternatives leave the transition brittle, undermining its legitimacy and, amid politicized media, souring many Bulgarians’ view of the European project. In contrast, Finland’s robust social contract rests on high trust, a strong welfare state, and consensus-based governance.


Yet forestry dependence creates a “triple bind” between climate goals, energy needs, and economic structures. Its resilience stabilizes an unsustainable status quo. Even in quasi-ideal-typical conditions, capitalist and neocolonial myths (e.g., regarding the Sami) linger. Gaps between the ESC’s vision and realistic solutions require short-term trade-offs between ecology, democracy, welfare, security, energy autonomy, competitiveness, and social legitimacy, which must neither lose sight of longer-term goals nor privilege economic interests, if the ESC is to become the democratic, inclusive, open (i.e. resilient) contract promised.


In Germany, forest, infrastructure, and renewable-energy conflicts reveal a social contract under distributive and territorial pressure. Protest coalitions, from left-wing globalists to conservative locals, hold conflicting visions of justice and transition, straining the Greens between ecological commitments and governmental compromise. These “hamper democratic resilience”, exposing uneven burdens and eroding trust. Germany’s resilience absorbs shocks but struggles for legitimacy when ecological policies disrupt established, growth-driven expectations.


The inclusive local participation the ESC and EGD espouse still lacks coherence and legitimacy in praxis. Portugal’s top-down, extractivist lithium, solar, and mobility megaprojects expose the EGD’s contradictions, raising “persistent problems of legitimacy, coherence, and justice”. Yet strong civic movements offset weak institutions, voicing the cases’ clearest bottom-up ecosocial imaginaries. This is not simply democracy versus technocracy: procedures, expertise, and community goals are all bypassed. Communities and experts opposing lithium extraction were ignored (even by the EU) given its strategic value for EU (not Portuguese) energy sovereignty, trumping the EGD’s ideals. The imbalance lies between the EGD’s stated socio-ecological and territorial goals and growth-driven imperatives, as the literature anticipates.


Several cross-cutting tensions and contradictions emerge across the four cases. First, green transition policies recurrently clash with extractivist economic models, whether in Bulgaria’s post-catastrophe, post-authoritarian, and later activism(s); Finland’s forestry dependence; Portugal’s mining and other mega-projects; or Germany’s infrastructure conflicts. Second, economic interests and climate ambitions, on the one hand, clash with social and territorial cohesion and democratic legitimacy, on the other: transitions implemented through technocratic, top-down processes, often misaligned with local communities’ and even experts’ views, risk eroding trust and generating resistance, as in Portugal and Germany.


Third, welfare expectations are hard to reconcile with ecological limits, particularly in Finland, where the welfare state’s material basis is tied to resource-intensive industries. Finally, EU-level GD goals interact with national and local political narratives, sometimes reinforcing support for transition, but often becoming targets of politicization or scepticism, as in Bulgaria and Portugal.


These tensions, identified in Bulgaria, Finland, Germany and Portugal, concern issues of legitimacy and coherence in how green deal policies are implemented. Namely, these issues relate to faulty participatory governance processes, enduring territorial inequalities, the exclusion of marginalised groups, and unimaginative approaches to community development. In sum, at least under a liberal, green growth-oriented vision of development, the European Green Deal shows promise to foster resilience and ecological progress. Yet, if it aims to drive the quest for a resilient (at least, pragmatic and policy-driven) ecosocial contract, groundwork on its legitimacy, inclusivity, and ability to build consensus is vital. The main challenge appears to rest on its ability to balance short-term political trade-offs and the longer-term aims of sustainable democratic and ecological resilience.


The construction of a truly resilient (eco)social contract requires directly addressing these and other tensions and contradictions. This can only be achieved by strengthening democratic channels and participatory governance, and by continuously addressing preexisting multilevel and multigroup social and spatial inequalities. Rethinking extant economic development models is also advised, including veering away from strictly growth-driven and technocratic approaches, driven primarily by economic imperatives and decoupled climate ambitions, towards more sustainable and democratic practices. Only by fully aligning the goals, values, and practices of democratic resilience, and of a normatively attractive resilient (eco)social contract, with those of ecosocial resilience can the EGD truly address the polycrisis and realize its promise of a democratic, inclusive, sustainable future for all European countries and citizens.

 
 

Join the Journey!

Subscribe to our Newsletter

Thank you for subscribing!

Contact us:
Dr. Anna Björk

Team Lead, Leading Researcher

Demos Helsinki

anna.bjork@demoshelsinki.fi

Johannes Jauhiainen
 

Expert, Impact & Communication 

Demos Helsinki

johannes.jauhiainen@demoshelsinki.fi

Dr. Emilia Palonen

Associate Professor

University of Helsinki

emilia.palonen@helsinki.fi

Helsinki Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Helsinki

hepp@helsinki.fi

helsinki.fi/hepp

  • LinkedIn
  • Youtube
Funded by the European Union

Funded by the European Union in the framework of the Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement Nº 101132631.

​

© 2024 by CO3

bottom of page