Renegotiating Bulgaria’s Social Contract: A Dilemma

On 18 December in Sofia, Bulgaria, demonstrators gathered to demand exclusively machine-based voting in upcoming National Assembly elections and the resignation of Acting Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov.

By Dr. Ruzha Smilova, Program Director at the Centre for Liberal Strategies.

The last major protests in Bulgaria were pivotal. They ushered in a prolonged political crisis, with seven early elections failing to produce a stable government. Since the end of 2025, hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians have taken to the streets of Sofia and other major cities to demand the government’s resignation and a change in the country’s mode of governance.

The protesters and a wider public beyond those in the streets consider the government deeply corrupt, slowing down the country’s development after EU accession. This “mode of governance,” often referred to as the Peevski–Borisov model, relies on an informal power structure in which former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov’s party depends on businessman-politician Delyan Peevski’s support to govern.

Critics say this allows elite networks to capture key institutions, such as the judiciary and prosecution, and to marginalise genuine opposition. Peevski leads the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – New Beginning party (DPS-NN) and is sanctioned under the U.S. Global Magnitsky Act for high-level corruption.

Despite recurrent protests, there has been little change. As the rule of law has weakened and corruption has deepened, Bulgaria has become increasingly ungovernable since 2021.

A Country Divided

Trust in government and leading politicians has plummeted—from already critically low levels—indicating that the social contract between citizens and governing elites is at a breaking point.

The reason there has been no successful renegotiation of this broken social contract to date is the presence of cross-cutting cleavages in Bulgarian society, leading to fragmentation of the political space.

These cleavages form around pro- and anti-corruption positions and pro-EU (Western) versus anti-EU geopolitical orientations, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

These cross-cutting cleavages structure the political space into three major camps:

Forming a stable anti-corruption coalition between actors diametrically opposed along geopolitical lines has proved impossible. Especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Political instability has therefore settled in, leaving the status quo largely unchallenged.

Calls for a New Social Contract

While the protests brought down the government in late 2025, attempts to form a new regular government failed, and new elections were called. President Radev stepped down (he was serving his second and final term, with one year remaining) and entered political competition, which will likely restructure the political space and make it less fragmented.

These recurrent protests indicate a weakening social contract, where the foundational rules of the political and social order are widely challenged. Yet the demand for “a new social contract” is rarely publicly articulated.

Demands for a restart—and indeed for a new social contract—were raised by protesters in early 2013, with little consequence. It was only in 2025 that the far-right, pro-Russian Revival party began mobilising support for “a new social contract,” promising to convene a Grand National Assembly to adopt an entirely new constitution.

As part of this proposed social contract, the Revival party promises to renegotiate the terms of the country’s EU membership (including revoking the commitment to join the eurozone) and to exit NATO.

With this in mind, no pro-EU party has publicly called for a new social contract, even while strongly criticising and urging changes to the country’s mode of governance. They fear that a renegotiated social contract may steer the country away from its European path. Yet an implicit—and limited—renegotiation of the current social contract is high on the political agenda of the pro-reform, anti-corruption bloc.

In his resignation speech, former president Rumen Radev explicitly promised a new social contract. However, beyond anti-corruption rhetoric, he provided few details regarding its substance, including whether it would involve constitutional change—an area he has previously presented as a priority, notably amendments aimed at strengthening the rule of law and curbing corruption.

Adopting this language signals strong anti–status quo intentions, potentially even steering the country away from its European path.

The dilemma for Bulgarian society can thus be framed as follows: how far are Bulgarians prepared to go in renegotiating their broken social contract? Do they only want to challenge the corrupt “mode of governance”? Or do they also want to renegotiate the country’s “civilisational choice” and return to the Russian sphere of influence rather than remain an integral part of Europe?

While there is undoubtedly a strong majority for the former, a growing number of citizens may favour a deeper renegotiation—a restart—of the current social contract. Herein lies Bulgaria’s predicament: defenders of the status quo use the majority’s fears of deep renegotiation to block any change to the country’s mode of governance. As long as this dilemma remains unresolved, further waves of mass protest are likely.