More than Cats and Dances: In Hungary, Social Media Has Played a Role in Challenging Viktor Orbán’s ‘Illiberal’ Regime

By Szilvia Horváth, University of Helsinki.

Péter Magyar of the Tisza movement on the campaign trail before the last EU elections. Picture: Creative Commons.

Post-socialist Hungary was considered the “poster boy of democracy”, but after Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party came to power in 2010, this brought about a considerable democratic decline.

For nearly a decade and a half, essentially nothing could shake Orbán’s power, which was based, among other things, on changing the constitution, altering the electoral system, and extending control over the media. In addition, the party also had support, while their rivals remained fragmented and divided. After losing the 2022 elections, the opposition fell into apathy.

At the beginning of 2024, a new opposition political figure exploded into this void: Péter Magyar. We witnessed the rapid rise of the Tisza movement in the lead-up to the 2024 European Parliament elections – and it has continued ever since. The new player, who suddenly appeared out of nowhere, got 30% of the votes in the elections. By the spring of 2025, the party was even ahead of Fidesz.

As part of the CO3 project, we conducted social media research on TikTok and Instagram during the European Parliament elections, to replicate real-world media use. In the process, we analyzed social media feeds in Hungary, which showed the rise and popularity of Péter Magyar and the Tisza party. What can we learn about their rapid rise in social media – and about social media itself in terms of whether and how it can help dismantle an autocratic regime?

One of the key aspects of the research was to understand what is happening on social media platforms widely used by young people and to gain a deeper understanding of their experiences.  Later, it turned out that a large number of the Tisza party’s voters were young people, especially compared to Fidesz, which seemed to have lost their support. So, what did they see here?

First, the difference between the two platforms. Algorithms have significant political implications. Instagram, for example, has presented a wide range of political content. Although we pretended to have a predetermined political preference, the algorithm didn’t differentiate accordingly. It tried to navigate us away from political content. Overall, Instagram wasn’t particularly suitable for circulating and consuming political contents of one’s orientation – unless we’re political omnivores and, on top of that, we especially like dance and cat videos (which, of course, we do).

TikTok on the other hand is a different story as it is a platform suited for political content. The most typical videos on Péter Magyar included: a professional campaign video, in which the politician gives his speech in the countryside, the crowd can also be seen, while the background is a typical Hungarian rural scene with the church tower; the politician meets with one of the high-reach young influencers when he buys a pair of sneakers; or when the politician speaks to the camera, mainly about political, sometimes popular topics; occasionally during a Hungarian lunch.

In addition to these politicians’ videos, one could also see other types of videos, which are even more important. Magyar embarked on a two-month campaign tour, visiting nearly 200 communities, mostly middle-sized countryside towns—the strongholds of Fidesz for two decades.

This was unique in the history of Hungarian politics, where the opposition political elite focused mostly on the capital city.  Equally important is the fact that the campaign tour was broadcast on social media – above all, by the ordinary citizens who took part in it. So, the politician was present in the given place directly and via social media at the same time; either for the same, or the regional, or an even wider audience. As one TikToker put it, these events were so rare in everyday people’s lives that no one (that is, a top politician) has ever visited their town before.  

Social media has offered the potential to create, perhaps temporarily, a political public sphere in these settlements that they would never have had the opportunity to do before. We can say the same about Magyar’s movement as he primarily communicated through his own channels besides the country tour. By doing so, the movement, which was barely three months old, bypassed the existing channels where it was not present or those that were hostile to it like independent media and state propaganda.

The main content of the messages focused on the pervasive corruption of the Orbán regime and the promise to build a fearless Hungary based on a “new social contract” (quote from Magyar). In other words, with a regime change, to completely renew the country on a clear pro-European basis.

Over these few months, thanks to social media, the movement has become a real challenger to Orbán’s “illiberal” regime. While it is subject to a lot of criticism, anxiety or fear, social media can give space to anti-authoritarian movements as well.